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Abstract
Companies are expected to monitor sustainable behaviour to help improve performance, enhance reputation and increase 
chances of survival. This paper examines the relationship between sustainability committees and independent external 
assurance on the inclusion of sustainability-related targets in CEO compensation contracts. Using a sample of UK FTSE350 
companies for 2011–2015 and controlling for governance and firm characteristics, we find both board-level sustainability 
committees and sustainability reporting assurance have a positive and significant association with the inclusion of sustain-
ability terms in compensation contracts. However, there is no joint impact between the voluntary use of independent external 
assurance and the role of sustainability committees on CEO compensation contracts. Sustainability-related terms in com-
pensation contracts are more likely to be included, and higher compensation is likely to be paid, when assurance is provided 
by a Big4 firm and when a company operates in a sustainability-sensitive industry. Our findings highlight the potential of 
assured sustainability reports in assessing CEO performance in sustainability-related tasks, especially when sustainability 
metrics are included in CEO compensation contracts. Overall, our results suggest companies that invest in voluntary assur-
ance are more likely to monitor management’s behaviour and be concerned about the achievement of sustainability goals.
Keywords Compensation · Sustainability · Assurance · Corporate governance
Introduction
There is an increased emphasis on incentivising and reward-
ing management for the achievement of social goals. Com-
panies concerned about sustainability are likely to link 
executive compensation to sustainability in recognition of 
the view that management needs to be compensated for the 
increased risks associated with long-term social strategies 
(Frye et al. 2006; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009b; Eccles 
et al. 2014). Indeed, some companies are linking sustain-
ability performance to CEO compensation and recognising 
that if they connect sustainability performance and compen-
sation, they can become models for their peers particularly 
because sustainability reporting is evolving and investors are 
increasingly identifying the business value of sustainability 
performance (Tonello and Singer 2015). An E&Y (2010) 
report, for example, provides a summary of the major issues 
CEOs and boards of directors should discuss when consid-
ering sustainability reporting. In a question related to what 
governance systems and processes are needed to report on 
sustainability, it indicates that some organisations link sus-
tainability performance to executive compensation in order 
to sharpen their focus on sustainability issues.
This paper extends studies examining social performance 
as a determinant of CEO pay (e.g. Riahi-Belkaoui 1992; 
Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Cai et al. 2011; Francoeur et al. 
2017) and focuses on the impact of sustainability assurance 
and the existence of board-level sustainability committees 
on CEO compensation. The voluntary external assurance 
of sustainability reports can enhance their reliability and 
credibility and mitigate management camouflaging sustain-
ability issues (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Brown-Liburd and 
Zamora 2014; Cohen and Simnett 2014; Eccles et al. 2014; 
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Wong and Millington 2014).1 Prior literature provides mixed 
evidence on the relationship between executive compensa-
tion and social performance and is mainly based on cross-
country data or US settings. There is limited research on 
the effect of firm investments in sustainability on executive 
performance. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009b) call for 
external monitoring mechanisms such as external audit to 
assess the credibility of sustainability information and note 
that if CEOs are not compensated for the increased risks 
associated with social investments, they may seek less risky 
short-term alternatives. Additionally, the existence of board-
level sustainability committees with special oversight role 
for sustainability processes and reporting may help in assess-
ing executive’s sustainable behaviour and to consider this 
assessment through the inclusion of sustainability-related 
targets in CEO compensation contracts. This paper focuses 
on the role of governed sustainability information, i.e. the 
existence of sustainability committees and independent 
external assurance, on the inclusion of sustainability-related 
targets in CEO compensation contracts of UK FTSE350 
companies.
We find sustainability committees are associated with 
the inclusion of sustainability-related targets in compensa-
tion contracts. Moreover, firms that have their sustainabil-
ity reports externally assured disclose sustainability-related 
incentives in their compensation reports. There is no joint 
impact between the use of independent external assurance 
and the role of sustainability committees on CEO compen-
sation contracts. Compared to other providers, assurance 
provided by Big4 accounting firms is more likely to be 
associated with the inclusion of sustainability-related tar-
gets. Also, highly sustainable companies are more likely to 
monitor sustainable behaviour, i.e. have a stronger associa-
tion between sustainability-related terms in compensation 
contracts and both voluntary assurance and sustainability 
committees. Finally, our results highlight the potential of 
assured sustainability reports in assessing CEO performance 
over sustainability-related tasks, especially when sustain-
ability metrics are included in CEO compensation contracts.
Overall, our findings suggest that sustainability assurance 
is rewarded with higher CEO compensation and that compa-
nies concerned about achievement of sustainable goals adopt 
relatively more objective and credible monitoring mecha-
nisms. It is not only sustainability committees but also vol-
untary independent external assurance that affects the inclu-
sion of sustainability targets in compensation contracts. Our 
findings also suggest that if compensation committees take 
into account CEO involvement in sustainable strategies and 
link it to their compensation, then it is likely to improve 
sustainable performance and reduce pressures to maximise 
short-term performance. Also, voluntary assurance is likely 
to reflect a commitment to deeper values such as trust, cred-
ibility and confidence in reporting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the 
next section reviews the literature. The third section dis-
cusses the institutional background of sustainability com-
mittees and assurance in UK. The fourth section outlines 
the theoretical framework and develops the hypotheses. The 
fifth section sets out the research study in terms of sample, 
data and model. ‘Results and Analysis’ section reports our 
empirical findings, and the final section draws conclusions.
Literature Review
Executive Compensation and Social Performance
Most of the literature on CEO compensation and social 
performance has been done in the US context (e.g. Cai 
et al. 2011; Callan and Thomas 2011, 2014), Canada (e.g. 
Mahoney and Thorn 2005, 2006), the Netherlands (e.g. Kolk 
and Perego 2014) or in international settings (e.g. Francoeur 
et al. 2017; Maas and Rosendaal 2016). The results of exiting 
studies are mixed. Coombs and Gilley (2005) find employee 
performance has a positive impact on bonuses. O’Connell 
and O’Sullivan (2014) use agency theory to examine the 
role of non-financial measures in strategic performance 
management framework in terms of motivation, ability 
and effect on long-term value. They find customer satisfac-
tion enhances future profitability and that firms are likely 
to link CEO compensation to such a lead indicator. Callan 
and Thomas (2014) use a multiequation model to examine 
the link between executive compensation and CSR and find 
pay-for-performance relationship is significant and is linked 
with social performance, while Callan and Thomas (2011) 
find CSR is a determinant of CEO pay. Both studies use an 
index measure of the firm’s corporate social performance. 
Although O’Connell and O’Sullivan (2014) and Callan and 
Thomas (2014) investigate whether social performance is 
connected to CEO compensation, they do not explore the 
monitoring role of corporate governance mechanisms on 
executive compensation. Hong et al. (2015) identify corpo-
rate governance as a determinant of managerial incentives 
for social performance and examine the role of executive 
1 The assurance of sustainability reporting, which is not mandatory 
in the UK, is generally conducted by accounting or specialist firms 
in accordance with GRI guidelines. Due to the questionable quality 
of sustainability reporting, assurance from a third party can help vali-
date sustainability reporting.
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compensation contracts that explicitly incentivise managers 
for CSR. They argue that if CSR activities maximise share-
holders’ value, then it is more likely that executive compen-
sation contracts will be linked to CSR measured using KLD 
scores for social performance.
Prior literature also reports a negative association 
between executive compensation and social performance. 
Stanwick and Stanwick (1998, 2001) find a negative relation-
ship between CSR performance and compensation measured 
using annual salaries and bonuses, while Cai et al. (2011) 
examine the impact of corporate social performance on exec-
utive compensation using a sample of large US firms cover-
ing the period 1996–2010 and find CSR adversely affects 
both total compensation and cash compensation. Collett 
Miles and Miles (2013) and Frye et al. (2006) compare CEO 
compensation among socially responsible firms and non-
socially responsible firms and find the link between CEO 
pay and firm performance is weaker for socially responsible 
firms.
There are studies that find no evidence or partial evidence 
on the link between CEO compensation and corporate social 
performance. Studies such as McGuire et al. (2003) find no 
significant relationship between incentives and firm social 
performance, and Benson and Davidson (2010) find that 
improved stakeholder management does not result in addi-
tional CEO compensation. Cordeiro and Sarkis (2008) test 
whether there is an explicit linkage between executive com-
pensation and environmental performance and find partial 
evidence of a linkage and suggest that it is likely that US 
companies utilise the linkage between top executive com-
pensation and environmental performance as a management 
communication strategy to maintain their standing with 
stakeholders. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009a) examine 
the association between pollution reduction programs and 
CEO compensation and find that only environmental prac-
tices that have the potential to improve future firm perfor-
mance are rewarded. What is particularly evident about prior 
research papers is that the majority of them measure CSR 
using an index measure for corporate social performance 
such as KLD scores or they include only a measure of the 
environmental dimension of CSR. Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia (2009b) argue that the mixed findings in terms of the 
association between CEO compensation and social perfor-
mance could be related to social performance measurement.
Executive Compensation and Sustainability 
Reporting
Maas (2015) argues that companies can use incentives by 
integrating corporate social performance targets into execu-
tive compensation. Maas and Rosendaal (2016) examine the 
inclusion of sustainability targets in executive compensa-
tion using 490 listed companies from 11 countries and find 
companies use sustainability targets that focus on social 
issues in their remuneration plans.2 Kolk and Perego (2014) 
use four case studies from the Netherlands to investigate 
the performance criteria in bonus programmes and assess 
whether the introduction of sustainability-related bonuses 
is a credible signal or just a mechanism to keep up bonus 
levels. Francoeur et al. (2017) examine firms’ commitment 
to environmental sustainability based on key data, such 
as actual performance, reporting procedures, policies and 
guidelines, and management systems, obtained from public 
reports and financial accounts, interviews with stakehold-
ers and media files. They find environment-friendly firms 
pay their CEOs less total compensation and rely less on 
incentive-based compensation than their counterparts.3 
The relationship is stronger in institutional contexts where 
national environmental regulations are weaker.4 Although 
they argue that compensation committees should consider 
psychological and institutional factors when designing com-
pensation for CEOs, their study does not take into consid-
eration corporate governance mechanisms which may affect 
the relationship between social performance and executive 
compensation.
Schiehll and Bellavance (2009) examine non-financial 
performance measures used as a component of pay-for-per-
formance plans to align and compensate executive actions 
and to reflect the benefits of CEOs strategic planning and 
business initiatives. They argue that incorporating non-finan-
cial performance measures in executive contracts enhances 
investors’ decisions and boards’ ability to increase share-
holder wealth by monitoring managerial actions. Davila 
and Venkatachalam (2004) investigate whether CEOs are 
compensated based on non-financial performance meas-
ures and argue that non-financial metrics that are explicitly 
disclosed in compensation contracts are useful when they 
provide incremental information about the agent’s efforts 
beyond financial metrics.
There is limited research on the relationship between 
executive compensation and sustainability assurance. A 
2 Both studies rely on annual reports and proxy statements to deter-
mine the use of targets related to sustainability in executive compen-
sation.
3 The study identifies environmental-friendly firms as the ones who 
receive high ratings in the SiriPro database, an environmental index 
which combines firms’ environmental commitment and performance 
in a single measure. The database is assembled by Sustainable Invest-
ment Research International (SIRI) Company.
4 The level of country environmental regulations includes regulation 
standards on air pollution, water, toxic waste and chemicals, flexibil-
ity, subsidisation and the strictness of regulation enforcement. The 
findings of most cross-country studies on social performance and 
executive compensation may be affected by the institutional context, 
in particular maturity of environmental legislation and corporate gov-
ernance requirements.
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recent study by Brown-Liburd and Zamora (2014) argues 
that managerial pay that is explicitly tied to sustainability 
information is value relevant and that pay-for-performance 
incentivises managers to substantially invest in sustainability 
strategies and to report strong sustainability performance. 
They argue managers need to seek independent assurance 
of sustainability information to signal credibility, and inves-
tors will highly assess independently assured information 
that is linked to incentive system.5 The study finds in the 
presence of pay-for-CSR performance and high CSR invest-
ment level, investors’ stock price assessments are greater 
only when CSR assurance is also present. Moser and Martin 
(2012) argue that the voluntary and unverified sustainability 
disclosures raise reliability and credibility concerns which 
require external assurance, while Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 
(2009b) call for monitoring mechanisms to assess the cred-
ibility of sustainability information.
Our paper aims to contribute to the sustainability assur-
ance and governance literature by examining the role of gov-
erned sustainability information on top management pay. 
It aims to investigate the impact of sustainability reporting 
assurance and the existence of sustainability committees on 
CEO compensation after controlling for governance mecha-
nisms and firm-specific factors.
Sustainability Committees and Assurance 
in the UK
The UK Companies Act (2006) developed the concept of 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ stating that directors will 
be more likely to achieve long-term sustainable success if 
their companies consider issues related to the environment, 
community involvement and other long-term values. UK 
companies are increasingly recognising that their day-to-day 
operations have environmental, social and economic impact. 
They are also increasingly disclosing voluntarily on sustain-
ability issues through a variety of channels including the 
publication of stand-alone sustainability reports. Many have 
voluntarily established formal structures, such as board-level 
sustainability committees to promote sustainability issues 
with explicit responsibilities for oversight over social and 
environmental impact of corporate activities, reviewing and 
making recommendation regarding stakeholders’ proposals 
in relation to sustainability matters, reviewing and assessing 
company policies and practices with respect to sustainability 
issues including product safety, charitable contribution and 
environmental health (Financial Reporting Council 2016). 
The establishment of a board-level sustainability commit-
tee can indicate that the company has an active strategic 
position with regard to stakeholders (Ullmann 1985). It may 
be seen as an effective monitoring device for ensuring the 
quality of stakeholders’ engagement process and improving 
the range of disclosures provided to stakeholders (Michelon 
and Parbonetti 2012).
In the UK directors of listed companies are obliged to 
disclose narrative information on material issues, includ-
ing those related to social and environmental risks, which 
are likely to impact on firm performance (KPMG 2010). 
The reporting of sustainability policies and practices with-
out independent assurance however is of reduced value to 
stakeholders. In the UK, as in other countries, independent 
assurance of sustainability reports is not mandatory (Junior 
et al. 2014) and thus companies may voluntarily adopt assur-
ance to improve internal reporting process and quality of 
reported information, and to garner stakeholder confidence 
in reported information (KPMG 2008). The voluntary adop-
tion may also reflect and signal a commitment to deeper 
values such as trust, credibility and confidence.
There are three major assurance providers in the UK: 
accountants (typically Big4 firms), certification bodies and 
specialist consultancies. Prior literature suggests assurance 
provided by Big4 accounting firms is perceived to be of 
higher quality due to their extensive experience in financial 
statement auditing and expertise related to risk assessment, 
planning and consideration of materiality in providing assur-
ance as well as reputational capital (Gray 2000; Hodge et al. 
2009; Moroney et al. 2012). Romero et al. (2010) argue that 
assurance statements issued by accountants are perceived 
to be of higher quality than those issued by non-account-
ants. Assurers who are accountants are deemed to provide 
cautionary assurance on environmental disclosures, while 
consultant assurers are perceived as providing a reasonable 
level of assurance for their clients because accountants are 
subject to professional regulation and tend to be concerned 
about litigation arising from legal responsibilities relating 
to social and environmental reporting (Dixon et al. 2004; 
O’Dwyer and Owen 2005; Moroney et al. 2012). Assur-
ers who are accountants are also perceived as providing an 
objective and independent opinion which is considered more 
important than the cost associated with assurance services 
(Knechel et al. 2006).
In the UK institutional setting, SRA lacks credibility due 
to the absence of one unified benchmark against which sus-
tainability reporting can be evaluated and the absence of a 
single generally accepted ‘common currency’ for making a 
professional assessment of the accuracy and completeness of 
sustainability reporting (Smith et al. 2011; p. 426). The cur-
rent guidelines originate from very different professional and 
ethical rules and institutional bodies including professional 
bodies, corporations and non-governmental organisations 
5 A 2013 joint report by the Investor Responsibility Research Cen-
tre and Sustainable Investments Institute shows that a 43% of Fortune 
500 Firms link executive pay to sustainability issues (Patterson 2013).
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(NGOs).6 These groups provide guidance for SRA practi-
tioners and corporations vis-à-vis reporting and assurance 
standards that are different in scope and content (see Smith 
et al. 2011 for more details).7 Moreover, assurance provid-
ers use aspects of the various standards on an ad hoc ‘pick 
and mix’ basis (CorporateRegister.com 2008, p. 13). The 
complexity of SRA practice in the UK stresses the need for 
further investigation.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Development
Sustainability and sustainable development are concepts 
evolving in a world where social issues are becoming 
increasingly important. Sustainable strategies adopted by 
companies are important not only for societies and the 
environment but also for corporate survival (Deegan and 
Gordon 1996). Companies are expected to be accountable 
not only for their operations but also for the impact of their 
operations and to legitimise their activities. Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009a) argue that firms should reward their 
executives for any sustainable behaviour because it brings 
legitimacy, improves performance, enhances reputation 
with stakeholders and enhances firms’ chances of survival. 
Callan and Thomas (2014) argue that pay-for-performance 
should be expanded to include social performance so that 
compensation plans incentivise the achievement of social 
and environmental goals. If the company is adopting a sus-
tainable strategy where social and environmental aspects are 
an important focus, then it would be reasonable to expect 
compensation contracts to incorporate social and environ-
mental performance indicators in addition to financial ones 
(Deegan and Islam 2012).
Previous literature suggests that companies should pro-
vide CEOs with explicit incentives in their compensation 
package if they want to increase their environmental com-
mitment (Stanwick and Stanwick 2001, 2003; Cordeiro and 
Sarkis 2008; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a). Accord-
ing to stakeholder theory, compensation committees will 
respond to pressures from stakeholders including environ-
mental activist and social investment funds by explicitly 
using social targets in CEO compensation (Maas 2015). 
Although compensation schemes mainly focus on financial 
metrics and tend to disregard the value to other stakehold-
ers, inclusion of non-financial metrics may lead to good 
sustainable performance and enhance corporate survival 
(Baron 2008). CEOs can be held accountable for the sus-
tainable performance of the firm if firms include sustaina-
bility-related terms in executive compensation plan (Maas 
and Rosendaal 2016).
Some managers might be willing to adopt practices that 
are expected to have social value, while others may avoid 
them due to uncertainties about financial outcomes (Berrone 
and Gomez-Mejia 2009a). Therefore, to motivate CEOs to 
engage in actions that lead to good sustainable performance 
compensation committees need to provide linkage to sus-
tainability in CEOs’ compensation contracts (Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia 2009a). Hong et al. (2015) identify corpo-
rate governance mechanisms as determinants of manage-
rial incentive for social performance but failed to include 
related board subcommittees in their study. Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009a) argue that when sustainability duties 
are explicitly and formally delegated to a subgroup of a 
board, the board is in a better position to assess executive 
performance on these duties and to consider this assessment 
in CEO pay decisions. Non-financial performance targets 
are likely to be determined by the compensation commit-
tee in consultation with the board-level sustainability com-
mittee. From an agency theory perspective, the extent to 
which firms’ sustainability committees exercise oversight 
and monitoring of sustainability strategy and reporting will 
influence any reduction in information asymmetries, allow-
ing for more accurate assessment of sustainable performance 
and a tighter linkage between performance and total pay 
(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a, p. 108).
The existence of sustainability targets in CEO compen-
sation may pose a credibility question about positive sus-
tainable performance and raises the need for controllability 
in sustainable-related targets (Maas and Rosendaal 2016; 
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009b). The complexity of sus-
tainable strategies and actions goes beyond the expertise 
of board members and sustainability committees and in the 
presence of explicit pay for sustainability performance in 
CEO compensation voluntary assurance can add credibility 
and help to ensure that appropriate measurement standards 
have been applied (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 2014). Ber-
rone and Gomez-Mejia (2009b) emphasise that the use of 
compensation tied to sustainability needs to be monitored 
through external monitoring mechanisms.
Assurance can signal that sustainability information is 
reliable and it can also help companies to assess the achieve-
ment of their social performance goals (Simnett et al. 2009; 
Cohen and Simnett 2014), increase the transparency and 
credibility of information (Peters and Romi 2015) and 
increase corporate legitimacy and accountability (Kolk and 
Perego 2014). Additionally, sustainable firms are more likely 
to link senior executive compensation to environmental and 
social metrics, have greater interest in linking executive 
6 NGOs concerned with SRA in the UK include inter-alia Account-
Ability, the International Audit Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (corporateRegister.com).
7 Néron (2010) also refers to this complexity of standards and practi-
tioners as the ‘politics of accountability’.
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compensation to non-financial information and more likely 
to be committed to a third-party assurance to verify the 
accuracy of such information (Brown-Liburd and Zamora 
2014; Eccles et al. 2014). Therefore, we expect sustainability 
assurance to be linked to compensation systems and inclu-
sion of sustainability-related targets in compensation plans.
Board-level sustainability committees are put in place 
to monitor, guide and reward sustainable actions (Berrone 
and Gomez-Mejia 2009a), and thus, they can affect the 
relationship between sustainability performance and CEO 
compensation. In addition to the establishment of a com-
mittee specialised in social and environmental issues, Ber-
rone and Gomez-Mejia (2009a) suggest the use of alterna-
tive monitoring mechanisms such as external environmental 
audit to better manage firms’ sustainable behaviour. This 
suggests the need for further investigation of the joint impact 
of voluntary assurance and sustainability committees and 
whether the role of these two mechanisms is complementary 
or substitutive.
The inclusion of sustainability-related targets in CEO 
compensation plans is likely to be affected by the govern-
ance of sustainability information, especially voluntary 
assurance of sustainability reporting and board-level sus-
tainability committees. Thus, in this paper, we test the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
H1 Companies with sustainability reports that are exter-
nally assured are more likely to include sustainability-related 
terms in CEO compensation contracts.
H2 Board-level sustainability committees are associated 
with the inclusion of sustainability-related terms in CEO 
compensation contracts.
H3 Board-level sustainability committees substitute/com-
plement the existence of independent external assurance in 
the provision of sustainability-related terms in CEO com-
pensation contracts.
Research Design and Data
Sample
Our study is based on an initial sample of companies con-
tinuously listed in the UK FTSE350 during the 2011–2015 
period. From our initial sample of 1590 (318 × 5 years), we 
lose some observations due to missing data on some of the 
variables collected from DataStream. Our final sample con-
sists of 1345 observations.8 We use Thomson Reuters Asset4 
which provides data on the adoption and non-adoption of 
sustainability policies.9 We supplement this with informa-
tion extracted from companies’ annual reports to further 
investigate the extent of sustainability-related terms used 
in CEO compensation and the Global Reporting Initiative 
database for the disclosure of the existence of independent 
external assurance. CEO financial compensation data and 
corporate governance data are obtained from BoardEx, and 
other financial data are obtained from DataStream.
Regression Model, Data and Variables
We use logistic regression to examine the role of governed 
sustainability information represented by sustainability 
reporting assurance (SRA) and the existence of sustainabil-
ity committee on CEO compensation tied to sustainability. 
We apply one-year lag to our independent variable and 
other control variables. We therefore estimate how SRA, 
SUSCOM and other governance and firm-specific variables 
predict the subsequent increase in the use of sustainability 
information in CEO compensation contracts. We use the fol-
lowing model to test the first two hypotheses H1 and H2:
We test our third hypothesis and investigate whether SRA 
complements or substitutes SUSCOM in affecting CEO 
compensation by interacting these two governance mecha-
nisms using the following model:
(1)
SUSCONTRACTING
t
= 훼 + 훽1SRAt−1 + 훽2SUSCOMt−1
+ 훽3BODSIZEt−1 + 훽4BODINDt−1 + 훽5BODMEETt−1
+ 훽6BODEXPt−1 + 훽7CEOOWNt−1 + 훽8SIZEt−1
+ 훽9ROEt−1 + 훽10LEVt−1 + 훽11TOBINSQt−1 + 훽12BETAt−1
+ 훽13IND + 휀it
(2)
SUSCONTRACTING
t
= 훼 + 훽1SRAt−1 + 훽2SUSCOMt−1
+ 훽3SRAt−1 × SUSCOMt−1 + 훽4BODSIZEt−1
+ 훽5BODINDt−1 + 훽6BODMEETt−1 + 훽7BODEXPt−1
+ 훽8CEOOWNt−1 + 훽9SIZEt−1 + 훽10ROEt−1
+ 훽11LEVt−1 + 훽12TOBINSQt−1 + 훽13BETAt−1
+ 훽14IND + 휀it
8 We have balanced data in our panel data set. A balanced data set is 
a set that contains all elements observed in all time frames, whereas 
unbalanced data are a set of data where in certain years the data cat-
9 The Asset4 database which has already been used in the litera-
ture (see for e.g. Eccles et al. 2014; Cheng et al. 2014; Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2012; Birkey et al. 2016; Haque 2017), provides objective, 
relevant and systematic environmental, social and governance (ESG) 
information based on key performance indicators. Research analysts 
of ASSET4 collect data from sources including stock exchange fil-
ings, annual financial and sustainability reports, nongovernmental 
organizations’ websites and various news sources (Eccles et al. 2014).
egory is not observed. Using a balanced panel may lead to cutting 
observations. However, the power of a balanced or equal-allocation 
design is typically higher than the power of the corresponding unbal-
anced design.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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The variables are defined in Table 1.
The dependent variable in the regression model is 
 SUSCONTRACTINGt. We review companies’ annual 
reports and extract sentences/paragraphs that include 
references to sustainability in CEO compensation con-
tracts.10 If compensation is linked to sustainability activi-
ties,  SUSCONTRACTINGt takes the value of 1 (the firm is 
coded as offering sustainability incentives) and zero other-
wise (Hong et al. 2015). For additional test, we also consider 
the three financial components of CEO compensation: (i) 
salaries and bonuses which capture short-term compensa-
tion, (ii) equity-based compensation includes the value of 
restricted stock, stock options and other elements of long-
term incentive plans (LTIPs) as reported in the BoardEx 
database to capture long-term compensation and (iii) total 
compensation measured as the sum of CEO salary, bonus, 
the value of equity-based compensation and other compensa-
tion. Consistent with previous studies (McGuire et al. 2003; 
Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Cai et al. 2011; Francoeur et al. 
2017), we use CEO compensation as a proxy for top execu-
tive compensation because CEOs and other top executives 
are accountable for engaging in sustainable strategies includ-
ing sustainability reporting assurance.11
Our variables of interests are sustainability reporting 
assurance  (SRAt−1), measured using a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if sustainability reports are externally assured 
and zero otherwise, and the existence of board-level sus-
tainability committee measured using a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a committee exists and zero otherwise.12 We 
expect a positive and significant association between both 
the independent external assurance of sustainability reports 
and the existence of sustainability committees on CEO 
compensation. For additional analysis, we further measure 
sustainability reporting assurance using an alternative meas-
ure,  SRAProvidert−1, using a scale where  SRAProvidert−1 
Table 1  Variable definitions
SUSCONTRACTINGt 1 if a firm discloses CSR-linked incentives in its remuneration report, 0 otherwise
CEOCOMt−1 Total compensation paid to CEOs consisted of the sum of salary, bonus and the value of equity-based compensation and 
other compensation (such as pension paid, insurance and other benefits)
SALARY and BONUS represent short-term compensation
LTCOM is the value of equity-based compensation representing long-term compensation
Compensation data are expressed in GBP
SRAt−1 1 if sustainability report is externally assured, 0 otherwise
SRAProvidert−1 3 if assurance is provided by Big4 accounting firm; 2 if assurance is provided by non-Big4 accounting firm; 1 if assur-
ance is provided by non-accounting firm; 0 if no assurance service is provided
SUSCOMt−1 1 if a board-level sustainability committee exists, 0 otherwise
BODSIZEt−1 Number of directors on the board
BODINDt−1 Proportion of independent directors on the board
BODMEETt−1 Number of board meetings held during the year
BODEXPt−1 % of board members with functional expertise as a finance director (FD), finance manager (FM) and finance expert (FE)
CEOOWNt−1 % of company shares owned by the CEO
SIZEt−1 Natural log net sales
ROEt−1 Return on equity ratio measured by net income to total equity
LEVt−1 Debt to total asset ratio
TOBINSQt−1 Sum of firm equity value, book value of long-term debt and current liabilities divided by total asset
BETAt−1 Beta factor
IND Industry dummy. Grouping industries using the DataStream Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) level 1 industries, 
creating ten groups
t Year, 2011–2015
10 We identify companies incentivising sustainable behaviour, and 
we analyse the descriptions of non-financial performance to code the 
compensation as sustainability-linked. The most common descrip-
tions are: performance targets in relation to sustainability; the role of 
compensation committee in determining non-financial performance 
targets in consultation with sustainability committee; remuneration is 
linked to strategic objectives and risk management and its alignment 
with shareholders’ interests including the maintenance of health, 
safety and environmental risks; regulatory compliance with ethical 
standards and approach to risks (including environmental, social and 
governance risks); percentage of non-financial targets included in 
companies’ annual incentive plan.
11 We use the natural logarithm of CEO financial compensation vari-
ables to mitigate skewness and potential influence of heteroscedas-
ticity (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a; O’Connell and O’Sullivan 
2014; Francoeur et al. 2017).
12 Companies differ in the specific title they assign to the board sub-
committee dealing with sustainability reporting matters, e.g. corpo-
rate social responsibility committee, health and safety and environ-
mental affairs committee.
 H. Al-Shaer, M. Zaman 
1 3
equals to 3 if assurance is provided by Big4 accounting firm; 
2 if assurance is provided by non-Big4 accounting firm; 1 if 
assurance is provided by non-accounting firm; 0 if no assur-
ance service is provided. This enables us to provide pre-
liminary evidence on whether assurance quality affects the 
relationship and we expect a significant positive association 
between  SRAProvidert−1 and CEO compensation to indicate 
that external assurance provided by Big4 accounting firm is 
more important than external assurance provided by other 
assurance providers.
Prior literature shows a link between governance vari-
ables and CEO compensation (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 
1997; Murphy 1999; Denis 2001; Daily et al. 2003; Herma-
lin 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008; Cai et al. 2011), and Cai 
et al. (2011) note that firms tend to respond to increase in 
monitoring provided by corporate governance by increasing 
CEO compensation. We thus include a number of govern-
ance variables, i.e. board size, board independence, board 
meetings and board expertise, in our regression models. 
Larger boards with higher proportion of independent direc-
tors who meet regularly and have financial expertise are 
deemed more effective monitors and more likely to influ-
ence executive compensation (Murphy 1999; Denis 2001; 
Hermalin 2005; Cordeiro and Sarkis 2008). We also include 
CEO ownership as a control variable because prior studies 
suggest it is a potential driver of CEO compensation (Fin-
kelstein 1992; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a; Cai et al. 
2011). We measure it as the percentage of company’s shares 
owned by the CEO.
Following the executive compensation literature we 
control for a number of firm-specific variables which may 
affect CEO compensation. We include firm size  (SIZEt−1) 
measured by the natural log of total sales (Mahoney and 
Thorn 2005; Deckop et al. 2006; Callan and Thomas 2014; 
O’Connell and O’Sullivan 2014; Hong et al. 2015) and 
profitability measured by return on equity  (ROEt−1). Prior 
studies suggest that size and profitability are important driv-
ers of executive compensation and find a positive relation-
ship with CEO compensation (Callan and Thomas 2014; 
Hong et al. 2015). O’Connell and O’Sullivan (2014) argue 
that including size in the regression model controls for the 
relation between compensation and firm magnitude. Larger 
firms are more likely to hire superior executives who get a 
higher pay (Cai et al. 2011). We also include financial lev-
erage  (LEVt−1) measured by total debt to total asset ratio. 
The level of debt may motivate firms to use CEO compen-
sation to reduce agency problem (Francoeur et al. 2017). 
 TOBINSQt−1, calculated by dividing the sum of firm equity 
value, book value of long-term debt and current liabilities 
by total asset, is also included to reflect a firm’s growth 
opportunities (Chung and Pruitt 1994; Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia 2009a). Firms with higher growth opportunities need 
more qualified executives who are likely to be offered better 
compensation (Cai et al. 2011). We include risk measured 
using the firm market beta.
We also control for industry (IND) by grouping firms 
in the sample using the one-digit Standard Industry Clas-
sification (SIC) codes (Francoeur et al. 2017). For addi-
tional analysis we classify firms as sustainability-sensitive 
and non-sustainability-sensitive. Following prior studies 
(see for e.g. Patten 1991; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Patten 
2002), we identify firms in the oil and gas, chemical, mining, 
utilities, forest and paper products, beverage, tobacco, and 
aerospace and defence industries as sustainability-sensitive 
because companies in these industries are assumed to have 
greater incentives for providing a positive social image and 
their activities have greater impact on the environment.13
Results and Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarises our sample and reports descriptive sta-
tistics for the variables used in the models. The mean value 
of  SUSCONTRACTINGt−1 is 0.493 and indicates approx-
imately half of the companies in our sample disclose the 
inclusion of sustainability-related targets in their CEO com-
pensation contracts. On average, CEOs receive a total com-
pensation of £11,600,000. (Median value is £8,700,000.) 
The mean value of CEO salary is £1,260,774, and the mean 
value of CEO bonus is £1,152,365. The mean value of long-
term compensation  (LTCOMt) is £3,378,200. (Median value 
is £2,000,000.)  LTCOMt on average accounts for 30% of 
the total compensation, and it is higher than the average of 
salaries and bonus together. This is consistent with Fran-
coeur et al.’s (2017) observation that UK and US firms use 
long-term compensation the most and have the highest paid 
CEOs.
With regard to sustainability assurance and corporate 
governance variables, the mean value of  SRAt−1 in our 
sample is 0.373 and the mean  SRAProvidert−1 is 1.302 and 
indicates a large proportion of our sample firms have inde-
pendent external assurance from non-accounting consul-
tancy firms. The mean  SUSCOMt−1 is 0.784, mean board 
size  (BODSIZEt−1) is 9.416, and mean board independence 
 (BODINDt−1) is 0.665 which means that more than half of 
the board members in our sample are independent direc-
tors. The boards of directors meet on average 8.878 times 
a year, and over half of the board members have financial 
expertise. The mean  CEOOWNt−1 is 0.645. This is lower 
13 We rely on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) sector codes 
level 3 in our classification of firms into sensitive and non-sensitive 
sectors.
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics
a Raw figures in GBP 000 s
b Using the natural log of CEO compensation components. Variables are winsorised to adjust for outliers
Variablea Mean Median Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Max. Min.
SUSCONTRACTINGt 0.493 0.001 0.500 0.027 1.00 1.00 0.00
SALARYt 1,260,774 1,100,000 664,350.7 − 0.465 4.070 5,100,000 103,000
BONUSt 1,152,365 814,000 1,544,231 − 1.819 4.516 21,000,000 0.00
LTCOMt 3,378,200 2,000,000 8,249,297 − 2.186 6.249 250,000,000 0.00
CEOCOMt 11,600,000 8,700,000 12,600,000 − 0.169 3.406 270,000,000 331,023
SRAt−1 0.373 0.00 0.483 0.523 1.274 1.00 0.00
SRAProvidert−1 1.302 1.00 0.989 0.364 2.120 3.00 0.00
SUSCOMt−1 0.784 1.00 0.411 − 1.385 2.919 1.00 0.00
BODSIZEt−1 9.416 9.00 2.452 0.923 3.985 21.00 5.00
BODINDt−1 0.665 0.667 0.109 − 0.278 3.024 1.00 0.266
BODMEETt−1 8.878 8.00 3.074 2.017 11.534 23.00 2.00
BODEXPt−1 0.565 0.581 0.237 − 0.256 2.176 0.981 0.005
CEOWONt−1 0.645 0.677 0.144 − 4.142 18.165 0.679 0.015
SIZEt−1 7,464,584 1,134,600 27,000,000 − 2.349 16.888 362,000,000 − 27,200
ROEt−1 0.221 0.151 0.379 0.959 5.488 0.772 − 0.338
LEVt−1 0.205 0.185 0.171 0.694 2.895 0.714 0.00
TOBINSQt−1 0.412 0.431 0.229 − 0.069 2.362 0.940 0.001
BETAt−1 0.928 0.865 0.603 1.062 5.627 3.300 − 0.270
Means: industry n SUSCON-
TRACTINGt
SALARYt BONUSt LTCOMt CEOCOMt SRAt−1 SUSCOMt−1 BODSIZEt−1
Oil and gas 65 0.544 1,597,354 1,195,569 4,484,600 14,026,154 0.351 0.825 10.00
Basic materials 110 0.505 1,242,845 826,853 1,802,464 8,652,727 0.396 0.851 9.570
Industrials 295 0.468 1,203,278 832,902 2,827,932 9,720,339 0.346 0.722 9.222
Consumer goods 125 0.513 1,352,632 1,232,710 6,042,104 14,767,200 0.430 0.821 9.629
Health care 40 0.474 1,248,100 1,351,579 5,508,100 14,092,500 0.405 0.789 9.132
Consumer services 260 0.490 1,213,938 1,022,661 2,842,092 10,236,539 0.354 0.758 9.397
Telecommunication 40 0.529 1,239,850 1,026,487 4,325,800 11,740,000 0.429 0.824 9.382
Utilities 35 0.485 1,670,229 1,148,829 4,040,457 13,854,286 0.424 0.879 8.909
Financials 315 0.498 1,280,533 1,716,595 3,473,905 13,971,969 0.379 0.755 9.498
Technology 60 0.481 903,100 624,050 1,606,833 6,682,750 0.333 0.796 9.204
Means: industry n BODINDt−1 BODMEETt−1 BODEXPt−1 CEOOWNt−1 SIZEt−1 ROEt−1 LEVt−1 TOBINSQt−1 BETAt−1
Oil and gas 65 0.678 9.298 0.591 0.643 11,648,136 0.197 0.157 0.342 1.108
Basic materials 110 0.680 8.540 0.548 0.606 6,683,504 0.216 0.218 0.408 1.087
Industrials 295 0.661 8.826 0.541 0.661 5,120,265 0.231 0.205 0.435 0.880
Consumer goods 125 0.668 8.724 0.539 0.632 11,027,835 0.219 0.203 0.404 0.840
Health care 40 0.668 8.158 0.606 0.643 5,530,313 0.295 0.245 0.505 0.899
Consumer services 260 0.664 8.859 0.563 0.640 8,671,374 0.264 0.204 0.423 0.906
Telecommunication 40 0.675 9.029 0.557 0.678 5,738,350 0.189 0.228 0.457 0.837
Utilities 35 0.647 8.844 0.600 0.658 5,518,827 0.324 0.255 0.480 0.885
Financials 315 0.666 9.070 0.585 0.648 7,349,107 0.185 0.209 0.381 0.956
Technology 60 0.665 9.167 0.608 0.654 7,267,515 0.145 0.173 0.380 0.937
Means: subsample for compensa-
tion  structureb
n SUSCONTRACTINGt SALARYt BONUSt LTCOMt CEOCOMt
SRAt−1=0 855 0.430 13.920 11.597 12.878 15.971
SRAt−1=1 490 0.600 13.973 11.814 13.161 16.072
t test − 5.809*** − 1.761* − 0.740 − 1.031 − 2.492**
SUSCOMt−1=0 375 0.268 13.881 11.837 12.931 15.931
SUSCOMt−1=1 970 0.553 13.952 11.644 12.992 16.025
t test − 8.401*** − 2.003** 0.563 − 0.189 − 1.908*
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than the 1.69 mean reported by Cai et al. (2011) and the 
1.80 mean reported by Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009a). 
With respect to firm-specific variables, we find mean firm 
size  (SIZEt−1) measured by total sales is £7,464,584, mean 
 ROEt−1 is 0.221, mean leverage  (LEVt−1) is 0.205, mean 
Tobin’sQt−1 is 0.412, and mean  BETAt−1 is 0.928 which is 
consistent with the value reported by Francoeur et al. (2017).
Industry means for the regression variables show that dis-
closure of sustainability-related targets in CEO compensa-
tion contracts is highest for the oil and gas, telecommunica-
tion and consumer goods sectors. On average, the consumer 
goods sector has the highest long-term incentives and total 
CEO compensation. Also the consumer goods industry has 
the highest mean (0.430) for sustainability reporting assur-
ance and a relatively high mean (0.821) for  SUSCOMt−1, 
and the utility sector has the highest mean (0.879) for 
 SUSCOMt−1.
In Table 2 we also report the means and t tests of com-
pensation components for companies that have sustainability 
reporting assurance and those that do not  (SRAt−1=0/1) and 
for firms with sustainability committees and those without 
 (SUSCOMt−1=1/0). We find firms that have sustainability 
assurance have higher mean  SUSCONTRACTINGt, i.e. sus-
tainability-related incentive component included in the com-
pensation contract. (Mean value is − 5.809 and is significant 
at p < 0.01.) This is also the case for firms with a board-level 
sustainability committee. (Mean value is − 8.401 and is sig-
nificant at p < 0.01.) We also find that firms that have their 
sustainability reports externally assured pay higher total 
compensation (mean value is − 2.492 and is significant at 
p < 0.05) and higher salaries (mean value is − 1.761 and is 
significant at p < 0.10). Finally, firms that have a sustainabil-
ity committee pay higher total compensation (mean value is 
− 1.908 and is significant at p < 0.10) and higher salaries 
(mean value is − 2.003 and is significant at p < 0.05).
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for variables used 
in our analysis. We find that sustainability reporting assur-
ance  (SRAt−1) has a significant and positive correlation with 
 SUSCONTRACTINGt. It also has a significant and positive 
correlation with CEO total compensation and CEO salaries. 
 SUSCOMt−1 has a significant and positive correlation with 
 SUSCONTRACTINGt, CEO salaries and total compensa-
tion. Other governance variables including  BODSIZEt−1, 
 BODINDt−1 and  CEOOWNt−1 also have a significant and 
positive correlation with  SUSCONTRACTINGt. Among 
firm-specific variables,  SIZEt−1,  LEVt−1 and  BETAt−1 are 
positively correlated with  SUSCONTRACTINGt. The corre-
lation between independent variables indicates that multicol-
linearity is unlikely to be a concern. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable being regressed 
is reported in Table 3, and it shows that the lowest value is 
1.04 and the highest value is 2.24. (The average variance 
inflation factor value is 1.46.) This also suggests the absence 
of multicollinearity.
Empirical Tests and Findings
Table 4 presents the results on the relationship between 
assurance and inclusion of sustainability-related terms in 
compensation terms. Since  SUSCONTRACTINGt is a 
dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if firm’s compensa-
tion report has sustainability-related targets and 0 otherwise, 
we use logistic regression. Model 4.1 tests the impact of 
 SRAt−1,  SUSCOMt−1 and other board variables and firm-
specific variables on  SUSCONTRACTINGt. Results show 
that both  SRAt−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 are significant (p < 0.01) 
and positively associated with  SUSCONTRACTINGt, thus 
supporting our hypotheses (H1 and H2) that companies with 
board-level sustainability committees and with independent 
external assurance of their sustainability reports are more 
likely to include sustainability-related terms in CEO com-
pensation contracts. Our results support the argument that 
the existence of sustainability committees helps to assess 
executive performance on duties related to sustainability 
issues (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a). They are also 
consistent with the view that independent external assur-
ance of sustainability reports is more likely to provide con-
trollability of sustainability-related targets and enhance the 
credibility of sustainable performance (Maas and Rosendaal 
2016; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009b).
Model 4.2 tests the joint impact of  SRAt−1 and 
 SUSCOMt−1 and our third hypothesis on whether the role of 
sustainability committee and independent external assurance 
on the inclusion of sustainability-related terms in CEO com-
pensation contracts is complementary or substitutive. We 
find the interaction between  SRAt−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 is neg-
ative but not significant, while  SUSCOMt−1 remains positive 
and significant (p < 0.05) and  SRAt is positive and signifi-
cant (p < 0.10). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
there is no joint impact between  SRAt−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 
on the CEO compensation contract. Our results (see Model 
4.2) do not lend support to our hypothesis in relation to the 
substitutive versus complementary effects.
Additional Analysis—Assurer Quality
To examine whether there are variations of sustain-
ability reporting assurance in terms of assurance provider 
and the impact this may have on CEO compensation we 
undertake additional analysis in Models 4.3 and 4.4 using 
 SRAProvidert−1 as an alternative measure of  SRAt−1. Our 
results show that  SRAProvidert−1 is positive and signifi-
cant (p < 0.01), suggesting that external assurance pro-
vided by Big4 accounting firm is more likely to be linked 
to the existence of sustainability-related targets in CEO 
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compensation. This is consistent with prior literature and 
the argument that assurance provided by Big4 account-
ancy firm is of higher importance than external assurance 
provided by other assurance providers (see for e.g. Junior 
et al. 2014; Cheng et al. 2012; Hodge et al. 2009). We find 
 SUSCOMt−1 is positive and significant (p < 0.01). Model 
4.4 tests the impact of the interaction variable between 
 SRAProvidert−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 along with their indi-
vidual impact on  SUSCONTRACTINGt. We find the 
interaction variable is not significant and negatively associ-
ated with  SUSCONTRACTINGt, while both  SUSCOMt−1 
and  SRAProvidert−1 remain significant and positively asso-
ciated with  SUSCONTRACTINGt. Therefore, our results 
in Models 4.3 and 4.4 are consistent with previous models.
Among other governance variables we find that 
 BODINDt−1 is positive and significant (p < 0.05) in all 
models (4.1–4.4), and  BODEXPt−1 and  CEOWONt−1 are 
positive and significant (p < 0.01) in all models (4.1–4.4). 
Table 3  Correlation matrix
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Variables are as defined in Table 1
VIF SUSCON-
TRACTINGt
SALARYt BONUSt LTCOMt CEOCOMt SRAt−1 SUSCOMt−1 BODSIZEt−1
SUSCONTRAC-
TINGt
1.00
SALARYt − 0.004 1.00
BONUSt 0.029 0.164*** 1.00
LTCOMt 0.001 0.307*** 0.125*** 1.00
CEOCOMt 0.012 0.808*** 0.415*** 0.462*** 1.00
SRAt−1 1.28 0.164*** 0.051* 0.021 0.029 0.069** 1.00
SUSCOMt−1 1.21 0.233*** 0.057* − 0.016 0.005 0.054* 0.331*** 1.00
BODSIZEt−1 1.37 0.155*** 0.096*** − 0.007 0.018 0.057 0.305*** 0.247*** 1.00
BODINDt−1 1.22 0.095*** − 0.011 0.009 0.047 0.010 0.133*** 0.096*** 0.099***
BODMEETt−1 1.04 0.041 0.005 0.041 − 0.014 0.001 0.031 0.011 − 0.011
BODEXPt−1 1.23 0.037 − 0.029 − 0.008 − 0.009 − 0.012 − 0.153** − 0.121** − 0.111***
CEOOWNt−1 1.04 0.060** − 0.012 0.044 0.055* 0.005 0.042 − 0.018 − 0.021
SIZEt−1 1.52 0.186*** 0.116*** 0.017 0.085*** 0.083*** 0.296*** 0.284*** 0.371***
ROEt−1 1.17 − 0.020 0.025 0.020 0.043 0.041 0.006 − 0.035 − 0.015
LEVt−1 1.82 0.102*** − 0.023 0.006 0.001 − 0.022 0.185*** 0.152*** 0.022
TOBINSQt−1 2.24 0.024 0.010 0.024 0.008 0.017 0.030 0.069** − 0.150***
BETAt−1 1.11 0.089*** 0.057** 0.013 0.024 0.079*** 0.112*** 0.056* 0.126***
BODINDt−1 BODMEETt−1 BODEXPt−1 CEOOWNt−1 SIZEt−1 ROEt−1 LEVt−1 TOBINSQt−1 BETAt−1
SUSCONTRAC-
TINGt
SALARYt
BONUSt
LTCOMt
CEOCOMt
SRAt−1
SUSCOMt−1
BODSIZEt−1
BODINDt−1 1.00
BODMEETt−1 − 0.005 1.00
BODEXPt−1 − 0.299*** 0.053 1.00
CEOOWNt−1 0.029 0.016 − 0.014 1.00
SIZEt−1 0.252*** 0.086*** − 0.231*** 0.015 1.00
ROEt−1 − 0.018 − 0.064** − 0.069** 0.044 0.015 1.00
LEVt−1 0.046 − 0.003 − 0.177*** 0.020 0.171*** 0.086*** 1.00
TOBINSQt−1 − 0.035 0.040 − 0.215*** 0.086*** 0.230*** 0.297*** 0.631*** 1.00
BETAt−1 0.161*** − 0.084** − 0.071** − 0.084** 0.064** − 0.037 − 0.060** − 0.190*** 1.00
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Among firm-specific variables, we find  SIZEt−1 is posi-
tive and significant (p < 0.01), and  LEVt−1, and  BETAt−1 
are positive and significant (p < 0.05) in all models. These 
findings are generally consistent with expected direction on 
relationships.
Additional Analysis—Sustainability‑Sensitive Firms
Table 5 provides additional analysis for sustainability-sen-
sitive firms and non-sensitive firms. We classify firms as 
sustainability-sensitive when they operate in the oil and gas, 
chemical, mining, utilities, forest and paper products, bever-
age, tobacco and aerospace and defence industries (see for 
e.g. Patten 1991; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Patten 2002). 
We have 405 firms classified as sustainability-sensitive in 
our sample and 940 classified as non-sustainability-sen-
sitive. We use the same modelling as in Table 4, Models 
5.1 and 5.2 relate to the sustainability-sensitive firms and 
Models 5.3 and 5.4 relate to the non-sustainability-sensitive 
firms. Results show that for sustainability-sensitive firms 
both  SRAt−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 are positive and significant 
(p < 0.05) with  SUSCONTRACTINGt (Model 5.1). The 
interaction between the two variables is not significant, but 
the individual effects of  SRAt−1 and  SUSCOMt−1 remain 
positive for both variables and significant for the latter 
(Model 5.2).14
For non-sustainability-sensitive subsample, we 
find that  SUSCOMt−1 remains positive and signifi-
cant with  SUSCONTRACTINGt, while  SRAt−1 is posi-
tive but not significant (Models 5.3 and 5.4). Results for 
Table 4  Assurance and 
sustainability compensation 
terms
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Logit regression (random effects). Variables are as defined in Table 1
Dependent = SUSCONTRACTINGt
Expected sign Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4
SRAt−1 + 0.367*** 0.617*
SUSCOMt−1 + 0.936*** 0.962** 0.906*** 1.149***
SRAt−1*  SUSCOMt−1 ? − 0.268
SRAProvidert−1 + 0.183** 0.412**
SRAProvidert−1 *  SUSCOMt−1 ? − 0.266
BODSIZEt−1 + 0.015 0.016 0.012 0.014
BODINDt−1 + 1.355** 1.350** 1.323** 1.268**
BODMEETt−1 + 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.013
BODEXPt−1 + 1.353*** 1.350*** 1.261*** 1.244***
CEOOWNt−1 + 1.077*** 1.076*** 1.140** 1.133**
SIZEt−1 + 0.152*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 0.150***
ROEt−1 + 0.049 0.052 0.058 0.070
LEVt−1 + 1.141** 1.145** 1.185** 1.156***
TOBINSQt−1 + − 0.217 − 0.226 − 0.335 − 0.356
BETAt−1 + 0.284** 0.283** 0.285** 0.291**
Oil and gas 0.087 0.091 0.077 0.061
Basic materials 0.131 0.131 0.118 0.106
Industrials − 0.071 − 0.071 − 0.104 − 0.120
Consumer goods 0.042 0.045 0.010 0.011
Health care − 0.209 − 0.203 − 0.246 − 0.248
Consumer services 0.005 0.005 − 0.014 − 0.011
Telecommunication 0.169 0.175 0.198 0.192
Utilities − 0.186 − 0.183 − 0.240 − 0.237
Technologies − 0.109 − 0.105 − 0.149 − 0.142
_cons − 6.125*** − 6.141*** − 6.007*** − 6.173***
Wald χ2 113.06 113.11 111.60 111.59
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman 10.09 9.32 8.12 12.20
N 1345 1345 1345 1345
14 Untabulated tests using  SRAProvidert−1 as a measure of  SRAt−1 
show that  SUSCOMt−1 is significant and positively associated with 
 SUSCONTRACTINGt and  SRAProvidert−1 is positively associated 
with  SUSCONTRACTINGt but is insignificant.
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sustainability-sensitive subsample are consistent with our 
previous findings and suggest sustainability-sensitive com-
panies are characterised by a distinct governance structure 
which reflects interests of stakeholders and they are likely to 
link top management compensation to metrics that include 
sustainability performance.
Table 5  Sustainability-sensitive 
industries
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Variables are as defined in Table 1
Expected sign Sustainability-sensitive firms Non-sustainability-sensitive 
firms
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4
Dependent = SUSCON-
TRACTINGt
SRAt−1 + 0.664** 0.755 0.057 0.370
SUSCOMt−1 + 0.876** 0.899** 0.916*** 0.932***
SRAt−1*  SUSCOMt−1 ? − 0.108 − 0.323
BODSIZEt−1 + 0.231*** 0.231*** − 0.043 − 0.043
BODINDt−1 + 0.814 0.803 1.499* 1.493*
BODMEETt−1 + − 0.057 − 0.057 0.041 0.041
BODEXPt−1 + 1.523** 1.519** 1.621*** 1.616***
CEOOWNt−1 + 1.141 1.149 1.268* 1.265*
SIZEt−1 + 0.106 0.107* 0.248*** 0.2487***
ROEt−1 + − 0.965 − 0.967 0.332* 0.335*
LEVt−1 + 2.002 2.015 1.879*** 1.881***
TOBINSQt−1 + − 0.983 − 0.998 − 0.742 − 0.749
BETAt−1 + 0.179 0.180 0.147 0.146
_cons − 5.699*** − 5.724*** − 7.505*** − 7.504***
Wald χ2 33.66 33.59 82.07 82.05
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 405 405 940 940
Table 6  Assurance and CEO 
financial compensation
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Industry dummies are omitted with panel data fixed effect specifica-
tion. Variables are as defined in Table 1
Expected sign SALARYt BONUSt LTCOMt CEOCOMt
Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.4
SRAt−1 + 0.003 0.530 0.168* 0.146*
SUSCOMt−1 + 0.033 0.161 0.197 0.012
BODSIZEt−1 + 0.449*** 0.151 0.337*** 0.358***
BODINDt−1 + − 0.063 − 3.696* 1.279 − 0.071
BODMEETt−1 + − 0.008** − 0.089 − 0.032 − 0.015**
BODEXPt−1 + 0.009 0.511 1.136** 0.113*
CEOWONt−1 + 0.058 − 0.385 0.777 0.034
SIZEt−1 + 0.022 − 1.010 − 1.122* 0.005
ROEt−1 + 0.053* − 0.166 1.559*** 0.089*
LEVt−1 + 0.039 2.297 4.203* 0.003
TOBINSQt−1 + 0.018 − 0.144 0.549** 0.049*
BETAt−1 + 0.002 − 0.293 0.117 0.027
_cons 13.171*** 27.720*** 21.957*** 15.358***
F 5.23 1.17 3.52 4.14
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.422 0.123 0.151 0.361
Hausman 138.40*** 23.87* 24.53** 56.80***
N 1345 1345 1345 1345
 H. Al-Shaer, M. Zaman 
1 3
Additional Analysis—Assurance and CEO Compensation
Table 6 presents the results relating to the impact of sustain-
ability reporting assurance on CEO financial compensation. 
Model 6.1 uses  SALARYt as the dependent, Model 6.2 uses 
 BONUSt, Model 6.3 uses  LTCOMt, and Model 6.4 uses total 
compensation  (CEOCOMt).15 We find  SRAt−1 is positive 
and marginally significant with  LTCOMt (Model 6.3) and 
 CEOCOMt (Model 6.4), while  SUSCOMt−1 is not significant 
in all models. It could be that firms with board-level sustain-
ability committees do not rely on evidence from the assur-
ance service industry in assessing CEOs’ financial rewards.
When we investigate these relationships further by divid-
ing our sample into sustainability-sensitive and non-sustain-
ability-sensitive firms (untabulated), we find that only in 
the sustainability-sensitive subsample  SRAt−1 appears to be 
significant (p < 0.10) for  LTCOMt and  CEOCOMt but not 
in the non-sustainability-sensitive subsample. We note that 
 SUSCOMt−1 is not significant in both subsamples.
Additional Analysis—Endogeneity Test
We recognise that our sample may be subject to endogeneity 
issues. Although we used lagged SRA to address the poten-
tial problem of simultaneity and also introduced a compre-
hensive set of control variables that have been used in CEO 
compensation literature to avoid omitted variables issue, 
there might still be some unobserved factors that might 
drive our results. Thus, we also use instrumental variable 
approach based on two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation 
to mitigate potential simultaneous causality. It requires find-
ing a variable that is correlated with the first-stage depend-
ent variable (SRA) but not correlated with the second-stage 
dependent variable (CEO compensation) (Moffitt 1999). 
To accommodate this issue, following Cai et al. (2011) we 
use industry-mean SRA as an instrumental variable and we 
expect that firm-level SRA to be correlated with its industry 
norms, while it is unlikely that industry-mean SRA is linked 
to CEO compensation.16 We use Durbin–Wu-Hausman test 
to investigate the presence of endogeneity assuming  SRAt−1 
is an endogenous variable. Accepting the null hypothesis 
that our variable is exogenous confirms the absence of 
endogeneity effects. Durbin–Wu-Hausman results confirm 
that the hypothesis could not be rejected as the p value is 
not significant for each measure of CEO compensation and 
suggests  SRAt−1 is exogenous for each measure of CEO 
compensation.17 Based on the Durbin–Wu test we assume 
endogeneity is not present.
Recognising that there is no specific test that can measure 
the impact and size of endogeneity accurately (Van Lent 
2007), we apply another approach to check for endogene-
ity. Heckman (1976, 1979) proposed a two-stage estimation 
procedure using the inverse Mills’ ratio to take endogeneity 
bias into account.18 In the first stage, we run a probit model 
using SRA as the dependent variable. The estimated param-
eters are used to calculate the inverse Mills’ ratio, which 
is then included as an additional explanatory variable in 
the second-stage estimation (Greene 1993).19 The choice 
of assurance could be related to potential firm-specific 
characteristics such as size, profitability, growth, risk and 
industry. Large companies that are profitable, risky and from 
sustainability-sensitive industries (such as oil and gas, basic 
materials and utilities sectors) are more likely to demand 
external assurance and pay higher compensation ceteris pari-
bus. Thus, failure to control for this correlation is likely to 
yield a biased estimate of SRA influence on CEO compensa-
tion. Results from the first-stage regression are reported in 
“Appendix” and show that among firms-specific variables, 
 SIZEt,  LEVt and  BETAt have positive and significant asso-
ciations (p < 0.01) with  SRAt, and  ROEt has a positive and 
significant association with (p < 0.10) with  SRAt.
Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates from the sec-
ond-stage regression. The results show that both  SRAt−1 
and  SUSCOMt−1 have positive and significant associations 
(p < 0.01) with  SUSCONTRACTINGt (Model 7.1) and not 
15 All tests use panel data fixed effects with robust standard errors 
where Hausman tests confirm this as the correct specification. The 
fixed effects model cannot take time-invariant dummy variables, 
so industry dummies in this case are omitted, since the fixed effect 
model explains the portion of variance given by the distance between 
each observation and the individual mean (computed as zero for time-
invariant dummies).
16 It is important to check the validity of the IV approach; otherwise, 
it could lead to biased results. If the test of endogeneity finds that 
SRA is endogenous, OLS estimation, in which the specified endog-
enous regressors cannot be treated as exogenous, is inappropriate 
as a test methodology and an IV approach is required (Cornett et al. 
2009).
Footnote 16 (continued)
17 Using  SUSCONTRACTINGt as dependent, our Durbin 
(p  =  0.678) and Wu-Hausman (0.680) tests found that the p value 
is insignificant. Using  CEOCOMt as dependent variable, our Dur-
bin (p  =  0.111) and Wu-Hausman (0.087) tests found that the p 
value is insignificant; using  SALARYt as the dependent, our Dur-
bin (p  =  0.134) and Wu-Hausman (0.132) tests found that the p 
value is insignificant; using  BONUSt as the dependent, our Dur-
bin (p  =  0.981) and Wu-Hausman (0.982) tests found that the p 
value is insignificant; using  LTCOMt as the dependent, our Durbin 
(p = 0.608) and Wu-Hausman (0.611) tests found that the p value is 
insignificant, thus suggesting that  SRAt−1 is exogenous.
18 According to Heckman (1976), endogeneity refers to the fact that 
an independent variable included in the model is potentially a choice 
variable, correlated with unobserved factors relegated to the error 
term, while the dependent variable is observed for all observations in 
the sample (Jo and Harjoto 2012).
19 We consider SRA as the binary outcome of the selection equation 
and CEO compensation as the outcome of the main equation.
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significant for CEO financial compensation components 
(Models 7.2–7.5). The lambda term (INVERSEMILL) is 
insignificant in all models, suggesting that sample selection 
bias is not present and that OLS regression is appropriate.20
Additional Analysis—the Impact of Sustainability Compen‑
sation Terms on SRA
We further investigate whether reverse causality is present. 
We investigate whether the inclusion of sustainability met-
rics in CEO contracts is likely to help CEO to focus atten-
tion and insure sustainability initiatives are implemented. 
This may lead to a need for assured sustainability reports. 
The inclusion of sustainability compensation terms may 
result in the adoption of independent external assurance. 
We examine the effect of sustainability compensation terms 
and corporate governance mechanisms on the likelihood 
that a firm chooses SRA using a logistic regression model.21 
Subsequent tests incorporate a logistic regression model to 
examine whether the inclusion of sustainability compensa-
tion terms and corporate governance mechanisms impact the 
choice of assurance providers.
Prior literature argues that SRA is a function of industry 
and firm-related factors (see Simnett et al. 2009; Ruhnke 
and Gabriel 2013). Moreover, there has been an increasing 
recognition of the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
including board of directors and sustainability committees 
in monitoring sustainability performance and reporting 
(Post et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2013; Peters and Romi 2014; 
Trotman and Trotman 2015).22 The voluntary demand for 
independent external assurance could help reassuring the 
accomplishment of the sustainability-related tasks.
Table 8 presents the results on the impact of the inclusion 
of sustainability-related terms in compensation contract on 
sustainability reporting assurance. In Model 8.1, we exam-
ine the impact of  SUSCONTRACTINGt and firm-specific 
factors on  SRAt, and in Model 8.2 we incorporate corpo-
rate governance variables in the regression test. Models 8.3 
and 8.4 repeat the test using  SRAProvidert as the depend-
ent. Results show that  SUSCONTRACTINGt is significant 
(p < 0.01) and positively associated with  SRAt. Among 
corporate governance variables, we find that  SUSCOMt is 
significant (p < 0.01) and positively associated with  SRAt, 
and  BODSIZEt is significant (p < 0.10) and positively asso-
ciated with  SRAt.  BODEXPt is significant (p < 0.05) and 
negatively associated with  SRAt. We also find, among firm-
specific characteristics, that  SIZEt,  TOBINSQt and  BETAt 
Table 7  CEO compensation—
Heckman two-stage estimation
Variables are as defined in Table 1. The table reports the coefficients of estimates from Heckman two-stage 
method. In these models, we do not include firm-specific characteristics because we treat these variables as 
selection variables
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1
SUSCON-
TRACTINGt
SALARYt BONUSt LTCOMt CEOCOMt
Model 7.1 Model 7.2 Model 7.3 Model 7.4 Model 7.5
1.5
SRAt−1 0.087** 0.014 0.106 1.255 0.081
SUSCOMt−1 0.237*** 0.049 − 0.494 0.194 0.112
SRAt−1*  SUSCOMt−1 0.007 0.022 0.111 − 1.132 0.162
BODSIZEt−1 0.019** 0.021** − 0.058 0.081 0.014
BODINDt−1 0.461*** − 0.213 0.344 1.099 − 0.122
BODMEETt−1 0.006 0.003 0.061 − 0.003 0.029
BODEXPt−1 0.251*** 0.022 − 0.504 0.663 0.068
CEOOWNt−1 0.201** − 0.069 1.511 1.743* − 0.061
INVERSEMILL 0.110 0.937 − 3.240 6.477 0.922
_cons − 0.567 13.48*** 12.061*** 7.551** 15.494***
F 13.94 1.49 0.75 0.97 0.84
R-squared 0.096 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.007
N 1345 1345 1345 1345 1345
20 Since the sample selection bias is not present, there is no need to 
include the inverse Mills ratios in our regression tests.
21 We use the following model:  SRA t  =  α + β 1S USC ONT R ACT ING t 
+ β2SUSCOMt + β3BODSIZEt + β4BODINDt + β5BODMEETt + β6
BODEXPt + β7CEOOWNt + β8SIZEt + β9ROEt + β10LEVt + β11TO
BINSQt +β12BETAt +β13IND + εit.
22 See also Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014), Herda et al. (2014), Mar-
tínez-Ferrero and García-Sánchez (2017) on determinates of sustain-
ability reporting assurance.
 H. Al-Shaer, M. Zaman 
1 3
are significant and positively associated with  SRAt. Models 
8.3 and Model 8.4 provide qualitatively similar findings 
when using  SRAProvidert as the dependent.23
Summary and Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the impact of sustainability 
reporting assurance on CEO compensation after controlling 
for corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific fac-
tors. We respond to calls for more research in the area of 
sustainability assurance (Cohen and Simnett 2014) and seek 
to extend the literature which has largely ignored governance 
mechanisms related to social and environmental issues (Ber-
rone and Gomez-Mejia 2009a). Specifically, we investigate 
whether companies reward CEOs for sustainability reporting 
practices. Our findings suggest that companies with board-
level sustainability committees are more likely to include 
sustainability-related targets in CEO compensation con-
tracts. Moreover, our results also suggest that companies 
with voluntary sustainability assurance are more likely to 
include sustainability terms in CEO compensation contracts 
and have higher CEO compensation and that there is no joint 
impact between the voluntary assurance of sustainability 
reports and the role of sustainability committees on CEO 
compensation contract. We also find sustainability-related 
targets in CEO compensation contracts are more likely to 
be included when the company has voluntary assurance, 
provided by a Big4 firm, and is operating in sustainability-
sensitive industry. Further test investigates the reverse cau-
sality issue, in particular whether inclusion of sustainabil-
ity-related targets in CEO compensation leads to a need for 
assured sustainability report such that the sustainability or 
compensation committee could evaluate whether the CEO 
Table 8  The impact of 
sustainability compensation 
terms on SRA
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Logit regression (random effects). Variables are as defined in Table 1
Dependent variable Expected sign SRAt SRAProvidert
Model 8.1 Model 8.2 Model 8.3 Model 8.4
SUSCONTRACTINGt + 0.837*** 0.419*** 1.292*** 0.581***
SUSCOMt + 2.285*** 2.516***
BODSIZEt + 0.115* 0.076*
BODINDt + 0.767 1.188
BODMEETt + − 0.002 − 0.010
BODEXPt + − 0.901** 0.347
CEOOWNt + 0.002 − 0.005
SIZEt + 0.125*** 0.181* 0.142*** 0.035
ROEt + − 0.291 − 0.142 − 0.173 − 0.007
LEVt + 0.523 0.461 0.779* 0.452
TOBINSQt + 0.138** 0.172** 0.026 0.075
BETAt + 0.403*** 0.319*** 0.209* 0.037
Oil and gas − 0.647* − 0.644 − 0.668* − 0.773*
Basic materials − 0.269 − 0.449 0.021 0.085
Industrials − 0.215 − 0.242 − 0.215 0.081
Consumer goods 0.137 − 0.018 0.179 0.183
Health care − 0.585 − 0.852* 0.124 0.407
Consumer services − 0.233 − 0.382 − 0.103 0.010
Telecommunication − 0.055 − 0.001 − 0.205 0.049
Utilities 0.084 0.167 1.834* 2.265**
Technologies − 0.722 − 0.891** − 0.101 − 0.113
_cons − 3.239*** − 4.425*** − 1.400** − 2.416***
Wald χ2 77.25 121.30 83.00 226.60
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1345 1345 1345 1345
23 We followed prior literature in building our specification model 
(see Simnett et  al. 2009; Herda et  al. 2014; Martínez-Ferrero and 
García-Sánchez 2017) on the determinants of sustainability report-
ing assurance. These papers do not apply lagging to the right-
hand side variable of their models. However, we also run the 
test by regressing SRA on lagged independent variables and find 
 SUSCONTRACTINGt−1 is positive and marginally significant, and 
 BODSIZEt−1,  BODMEETt−1 and  BODEXPt−1 are positive and sig-
nificant with  SRAt. Our results show that providing references to sus-
tainability-related targets in CEO compensation contract disclosed in 
companies’ annual reports in year t will lead to acquiring assurance in 
year t, while it is not very likely for the following year.
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has performed well the sustainability-related tasks. Results 
show that sustainability metrics included in compensation 
plans lead to a demand for independent external assurance.
Our paper has a few limitations which provide opportuni-
ties for future research. The main focus of our paper is to 
examine the direct impact of sustainability reporting assur-
ance on CEO compensation. We estimate how SRA predicts 
the subsequent increase in CEO compensation and address 
the potential problem of causality and simultaneity. Future 
research can complement our study by considering the indi-
rect link between SRA and CEO compensation through cor-
porate financial performance. It could also explore patterns 
in SRA/SUSCOM adoption using a wider, longitudinal data 
set. Moreover, our sample is based on the UK FTSE350 
that tend to be large in size. Further research may examine 
the impact of SRA on CEO compensation in smaller firms 
and in other institutional contexts in which governance of 
sustainability reporting is different.
Our paper is likely to be of interest to companies, regula-
tors and practitioners. In order to ensure that sustainability is 
sufficiently embedded with an organisation, companies need 
to consider sustainability-related targets in compensation con-
tracts which will motivate boards and management to achieve 
those targets. Irresponsible actions that have a negative impact 
on sustainability and company’s reputation can still implic-
itly affect incentive awards. However, a broader push to more 
explicitly tie sustainability metrics to core business models 
can be a more effective strategy and a useful reminder that 
sustainability is a major corporate concern (Burchman and 
Sullivan 2017). Moreover, sustainability metrics incorporated 
in performance measurement and compensation scheme need 
to be well-defined metrics critical in achieving sustainability-
related objectives; otherwise, sustainability may become an 
elusive goal. Independent external assurance should help in 
assessing the quality of these metrics.
While there is a growing trend in companies linking sus-
tainability to executive compensation, such linkage contin-
ues to be an evolving practice that requires companies to be 
held to a higher standard of accountability for their practice 
(Glass Lewis 2016). Investors seem to be showing a grow-
ing interest in companies linking compensation and sustain-
ability and are driving part of the growth of such evolv-
ing practice. The 2013 report by EY and GreenBiz Group 
(2013) summarises the results based on a survey consisting 
of executives and corporate leaders to provide their expertise 
and perspective on corporate initiatives, laws and regula-
tions—30% of corporate respondents stated that they had 
received inquiries from shareholders regarding their practice 
in linking executive compensation to sustainability metrics, 
while 21% stated that compensation was partially driven by 
sustainability performance.
Companies need to adopt an approach that integrates sus-
tainable business practices in operational decision-making 
and be governed by board of directors set corporate goals 
and strategies in accordance with the need to balance the 
interests of key stakeholders. Sustainable companies assign 
their boards the responsibility to oversee sustainability 
issues and establish devoted committees committed to sus-
tainability-related tasks (Salvioni et al. 2016). Our findings 
have implications from the governance perspective; it sends 
out a message to corporate boards to explicitly embrace the 
proposition that sustainability is a core indicator of CEO’s 
responsibilities and performance.
From a regulatory perspective, policymakers could con-
sider issuing guidelines for compensation committees to 
develop compensation policies with assured sustainable 
targets. This might better align executive incentives with 
sustainability, improve sustainable performance and reduce 
pressures to maximise short-term performance. The success 
of such initiatives however will depend, inter-alia, on the 
disclosure of credible sustainability-related information. Our 
findings may help to inform regulators of the importance of 
the sustainability assurance process and the role of governed 
sustainability information on top management pay and in 
promoting sustainable behaviour.
The United Nation Principles for Responsible Invest-
ment (UNPRI 2012) released guidance in June 2012 for the 
integration of environmental, social and governance issues 
in executive pay addressing three main areas of building 
compensation packages that successfully utilise sustainabil-
ity metrics: (i) identifying sustainability metrics for each 
company; (ii) linking these metrics to executive compensa-
tion plan; and (iii) providing high-quality disclosure on sus-
tainability compensation terms. Our study has implications 
from the financial statement analysis perspective; it requires 
companies to voluntarily report and integrate sustainability 
into financial statement and to demand independent external 
assurance over sustainability reports to enhance the quality 
of reporting. Finally, from an ethical perspective, companies 
that proactively make sustainability core to their business 
strategy are likely to stimulate loyalty from employees, cus-
tomers, suppliers, communities and investors, enhance their 
reputation and create value for all stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, civil society and the planet.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecom-
mons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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